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Beginning on inauguration day, President Trump has attempted an executive repeal of 
the Affordable Care Act. In doing so, he has tested the limits of presidential power. He 
has challenged the force of institutional and non-institutional constraints. And, 
ironically, he has helped boost public support for the ACA’s central features. The first 
two sections of this article respectively consider the use of the President’s tools to 
advance and to subvert health reform. The final two sections consider the forces 
constraining the administration’s attempted executive repeal. I argue that the most 
important institutional constraint, thus far, is found in multifaceted actions by states – 
and not only blue states. I also highlight the force of public voices.  Personal stories, 
public opinion, and 2018 election results – bolstered by presidential messaging – 
reflect growing support for government-grounded options and statutory coverage 
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protections.  Indeed, in a polarized time, “refine and revise” seems poised to supplant 
“repeal and replace” as the conservative focus countering liberal pressure for a 




“I am not the first president to take up this cause,” President Obama said 
before a joint session of Congress, “but I am determined to be the last.”1 He won’t be. 
And neither will President Trump. With a polarized Congress failing to refine, repeal, 
revise, or replace the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), the executive branch has assumed 
an outsized role in shaping, and now reshaping, the contours of health reform. 
Beginning on inauguration day, President Trump has attempted an executive repeal of 
the ACA. In doing so, he has tested the limits of executive power. He has challenged 
the force of institutional and non-institutional constraints. And, ironically, he has 
helped boost public support for the ACA’s central features. 
The first two sections of this paper respectively consider the uses of the 
president’s tools to advance and to subvert health reform. The presidential 
megaphone—the informal power of persuasion—has been central to the successful 
enactment of health reform legislation, notably including “Obamacare.” The century-
long leadup to that historic legislation informs its structure, implementation 
challenges, and future options. In using the presidential megaphone to disparage the 
ACA and unsuccessfully rally Congress to repeal it, President Trump appears to have 
bolstered its legislative grounding. 
In addition to a megaphone, the Resolute desk holds a landline and a pen. 
These formal tools of statutory implementation include the power to sign executive 
orders, oversee regulatory measures, and shape agency direction. President Trump has 
made extensive use of these tools to undermine the ACA’s coverage protections. 
Through a scattershot of complex managerial, regulatory, and litigative actions, his 
administration continues to threaten, but has not yet destroyed, the individual 
insurance marketplaces. The threat comes not only from specific executive-branch 
actions, but also from the general uncertainty they sow in an endeavor that depends 
upon voluntary private business involvement.  
The final two sections of this paper consider the constraining forces on this 
attempted executive repeal. President Trump has, in effect, shot holes in the ACA-
constructed dike that protects the individual coverage pool. Thus far, the fingers 
plugging those holes, and the feet bracing the dike, belong to the states. These are not 
only blue fingers and feet. Key state decisions, particularly intrastate managerial and 
regulatory responses,2 have been distinctly bipartisan. In addition, Democratic-leaning 
                                                 
1 President Barack Obama, Remarks to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care (Sept. 9 2009), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/video/President-Obama-Address-to-Congress-on-Health-Insurance-
Reform#transcript [https://perma.cc/ERS4-APZA]. 
2 See, e.g., A Bipartisan Blueprint for Improving Our Nation’s Health System Performance, COLORADO 
OFFICIAL STATE WEB PORTAL (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://www.colorado.gov/governor/sites/default/files/bipartisan_governors_blueprint_022218final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RJ3E-WZ7P] (five state governors, two Democrat, two Republican, and one Independent, 
issued bipartisan "blueprint" outlining suggestions to preserve insurance coverage and improve the nation’s 
healthcare system performance).  
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states have instigated or intervened in several lawsuits,3 taking a historically atypical 
position that aims to bolster federal power and nationally uniform rules. 
Another significant and interwoven check on the president’s power arises 
from Americans’ stories about their health care challenges and their beliefs about the 
role of the federal government. With this issue, the personal readily becomes the 
political. Although the ACA remains highly polarizing, it now polls more favorably 
than not,4 and central provisions enjoy strong, bipartisan support.  This polling shift 
seems to have impacted campaign messaging in the 2018 elections.  Furthermore, the 
results of that election evidence the expanding support for government-grounded 
coverage options.   
“Now, I have to tell you it’s an unbelievably complex subject,” President 
Trump said as Republican Congressmembers struggled unsuccessfully to coalesce 
around an ACA replacement plan. “Nobody knew health care could be so 
complicated.”5 If that were ever true, it isn’t now. Previously arcane health policy 
ideas are commonly bandied about. Health care and the means to pay for it continue to 
engage the public, as evidenced by the issue’s ongoing prominence in state and 
national campaigns. There is increasing support for the proposition that the 
government should ensure health care access for all citizens and should maintain legal 
protections for those with pre-existing conditions. 
Presidential efforts to the opposite end can be constrained, but not easily or 
completely. To date, state-level actions and public opinion expression have checked 
the president’s power, but in a piecemeal and incomplete fashion. Similarly, judicial 
review might ultimately block one hole-in-the-ACA-dike regulation or another as a 
violation of administrative procedures or statutory authority. These legal challenges 
take time to wend their way through the courts, however, and they do not address the 
generalized threat to the ACA’s coverage framework and the resulting implementation 
uncertainty. Ultimately, a robust constraint requires congressional action.  
Indeed, the 116th Congress and subsequent Congresses may now have a pre-
existing problem. Personal stories, public opinion, and 2018 election results—
bolstered by presidential and campaign messaging—might have decisively shifted the 
legislative landscape. In a polarized time, “refine and revise” seems poised to supplant 
“repeal and replace” as the conservative focus countering liberal pressure for a 
common option grounded in Medicare. 
 
                                                 
3 Katie Keith, Two New Lawsuits Challenge Trump Administration Actions on Health Reform, HEALTH AFF. 
BLOG (Sept. 17. 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180917.479910/full/ 
[https://perma.cc/8NX9-QRG8] (Democratic attorneys general and governors intervened in Texas v. United 
States to argue in defense of the constitutionality of the ACA). 
4 Ashely Kirzinger et al., Kaiser Health Tracking Poll – Late Summer 2018: The Election, Pre-Existing 
Conditions, and Surprises on Medical Bills, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Sept. 5, 2018) 
https://www.kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-late-summer-2018-the-election-
pre-existing-conditions-and-surprises-on-medical-bills/ [https://perma.cc/N2BR-F67P] (finding that 50% of 
Americans view the ACA favorably and 40% view it unfavorably). 
5 Kevin Liptak, Trump: “Nobody Knew Health Care Could Be So Complicated”, CNN, (Feb. 28, 2017) 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/27/politics/trump-health-care-complicated/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/7XBV-VU7D].  
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II. BEFORE MEDICARE AND BEYOND OBAMACARE, THE 
PRESIDENTIAL MEGAPHONE DIRECTS HEALTH REFORM LEGISLATION 
The president gets one of the world’s best megaphones.6 History shows that 
this tool—the informal power of persuasion—has been critical to the enactment of 
health reform laws, including, notably, the ACA. Not for nothing is it routinely 
referred to as “Obamacare.” Originally used as a slur by opponents, and later embraced 
by proponents, this statutory nickname may before long be considered simply a neutral 
term that reflects the president’s central role in the law’s enactment. 
The century-long leadup to the ACA’s historic passage informs its structure, 
implementation challenges, and future options. Indeed, President Trump’s megaphone 
use might have contributed to a left-ward shift in policy options. The future could 
harken back to the past, with something like President Nixon’s plan the conservative 
option; President Truman’s general framework the liberal vision; and a hybrid the 
possible compromise for a polarized country. 
 
A. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND COVERAGE ADVOCACY 
“[T]he power of the presidency is the power to persuade,” write political 
scientists David Blumenthal and James Morone, stressing that “in the debate over 
health care there is no greater force.”7 They draw this conclusion from an in-depth 
study of the 11 presidents from Franklin D. Roosevelt8 to George W. Bush and their 
struggles with “the health care octopus.” This octopus has been and continues to be 
“highly personal, politically perilous, technically complicated.”9 
Franklin D. Roosevelt planned to add health coverage to the Social Security 
Act, a key legislative achievement of his tenure.10 Doing so, he stressed, would require 
his full persuasive powers to rally the public and wrangle Congress.11 In a harbinger of 
stalemates to come, FDR’s proposal was scuttled by interest group opposition (the 
American Medical Association), politicized drafting challenges (the Social Security 
Act), and urgent national priorities (World War II).12 
Years later, President Lyndon B. Johnson arrived in office with a public 
passion for health reform, the principled outlines of a plan, and the skill to quickly 
manage the Congressional process—all of which he used to secure the most important 
health care legislation of the last century.13 The Medicare legislation established a 
federal health insurance system for all Americans over age 65.14 That was and 
continues to be viewed by many advocates as a precursor to a truly universal system. 
                                                 
6 DAVID BLUMENTHAL & JAMES A MORONE, THE HEART OF POWER: HEALTH AND POLITICS IN THE OVAL 
OFFICE 4 (U. of Cal. Press, 2d ed. 2010) (“Presidents control one of the world’s great megaphones”).   
7 Id. at 7 (The authors acknowledge and draw on the work of “the dean of presidential studies,” Richard 
Neustadt). 
8 Id. at 11 (Republican Theodore Roosevelt is often credited as the first president to press for universal, 
government-grounded health care coverage, though he did so four years after vacating “the bully pulpit” and 
while campaigning unsuccessfully in 1912 to recapture the office. It is with his cousin, Democrat Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, that the president’s role here takes shape). See also Obama Remarks on Healthcare, supra note 
1 (“It has now been nearly a century since Theodore Roosevelt first called for health care reform.”). 
9 BLUMENTHAL & MORONE, supra note 6, at 11. 
10 Id. at 38.  
11 Id. at 11. 
12 See generally BLUMENTHAL & MORONE, supra note 6, at 21-56 (describing President Roosevelt’s 
difficulties with health reform). 
13 Id. at 163.   
14 Id.  
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Its fraternal twin, Medicaid, established a joint federal-state program to provide 
coverage for certain categories of low-income Americans.15 
Democrats Harry Truman and Bill Clinton both featured universal coverage 
in  their  successful presidential campaigns.16 Truman, who followed FDR’s 12 years 
in office, envisioned a comprehensive, government-administered program for all, 
conceptually similar to what would later be enacted as Medicare.17 Clinton—by 
contrast and reflective of his post-Reagan era—envisioned a multi-faceted approach 
grounded in private insurance and employer-provided coverage.18 Clinton’s plan bore 
strong similarities to the national health coverage strategy that Republican Richard 
Nixon had unsuccessfully advanced decades earlier.19 Both the Truman and Clinton 
electoral mandates floundered.20 
Republicans Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush advocated in public and 
with Congresses for an expanded private-sector role in Medicare and ushered in the 
largest legislative expansions of that program.21 Reagan’s Catastrophic Coverage Act 
was repealed before it went into effect, largely because of protests from seniors who 
objected to bearing much of its costs.22 Bush’s Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act, however, continues to thrive with strong public 
support for the privately run (and heavily government subsidized) Part D program.23 
 
B. PRESIDENT OBAMA AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
President Obama drew on the lessons from his predecessors’ successes and 
failures to enact the most significant health reform legislation since 1965. His passion 
for the topic animated his campaign, and he arrived in office with an outline grounded 
in key principles: near universality, pre-existing condition protection, and 
affordability.24 He used the presidential megaphone to repeatedly make variations on 
this point: “In the wealthiest nation on Earth, no one should go broke just because they 
get sick.”25 Despite Obama’s generally wonkish inclination, he avoided the policy 
weeds that dragged down the Clinton plan, leaving the details to Congress.26 
                                                 
15 Sallie Thieme Sanford, Health Care’s Fraternal Twins at 50: The Birth and Development of Medicare and 
Medicaid, JURIST: BLOG (Nov. 1, 2015, 7:03 AM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2015/11/sallie-
thieme-sanford-healthcare/; see also Abbe R. Gluck, The Law of Medicare and Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE 
J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS. 1, 2 (2015) (describing the similarities and differences between Medicare 
and Medicaid).  
16 BLUMENTHAL & MORONE, supra note 6, at 85, 355. 
17 Id. at 70.  
18 Id. at 85, 356.  
19 Id. at 356.  
20 Id. at 380.  
21 See Id. at 304, 387-98, 416-17 (discussing Reagan’s and George W. Bush’s Medicare reforms).  
22 Id. at 330.  
23 Id. at 393. 
24 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Town Hall Meeting on Health Care in Green 
Bay, Wisconsin (June 11, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
town-hall-meeting-health-care-green-bay-wisconsin [https://perma.cc/E92P-7T6J] (“None of these plans, 
though, would be able to deny coverage on the basis of pre-existing conditions. Every plan should include an 
affordable, basic benefits package”).  
25 President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the Anniversary of the Affordable Care Act, 
(Mar. 23, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/23/statement-president-
anniversary-affordable-care-act [https://perma.cc/3UTP-UVTC]; see also, President Barack Obama, 
Opinion, Why We Need Healthcare Reform, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 15, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/opinion/16obama.html [https://perma.cc/T367-JB6N] 
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He did so perhaps to a fault, as the House and Senate held dozens of hearings, 
advancing several bills, and taking amendments from both sides of the aisle.27 It was 
during this time that Obama and the Democrats at times lost control of the narrative. 
As Morone describes it, “right-wing populists, self-styled Tea Party activists, roared 
into the health policy discussion with fury over supposed ‘government death panels.’28 
The claims—a variation on the old cry of ‘socialized medicine—were pungent, 
memorable, simple, and effective.”29 This was grass roots opposition, grounded in 
anti-government and other perspectives, a distinct public voice with staying power.30 
President Obama persisted despite a profound economic crisis and an election 
that seemed to doom the proposal’s chances. After the House and Senate had passed 
health reform bills, but before the needed reconciliation, Senator Kennedy died, and 
his elected replacement vowed to vote against the bill.31 “Don’t walk away from 
reform,” the president urged in the 2010 State of the Union address. “Not now. Not 
when we are so close. Let us find a way to come together and finish the job for the 
American people.”32 Spurred on by Obama’s speeches and televised, hours-long 
meetings with Republican and Democratic leadership, a work-around got an imperfect 
bill across the finish line, though with no Republican support.33 
President Obama signed into law a vast, multifaceted statute that 
fundamentally aims to broaden access, improve quality, and lower costs through a 
variety of intertwined mechanisms. At its heart, though, is near universal access to 
comprehensive health insurance. The ACA advances this goal through its four M’s of 
Access: the mandate for individuals; the mandate for large employers; the Medicaid 
expansion; and the marketplace protections.34  
The individual mandate – rendered toothless and perhaps unconstitutional by 
the 2017 federal tax law – requires most citizens to maintain qualified health insurance 
unless exempted (for financial or other reasons) or pay a tax penalty, which is set at $0 
                                                                                                                      
(describing the four main points of his plan: affordable for all, easing skyrocketing health costs, efficiency 
and accountability of insurance companies).  
26 See James Morone, Presidents and Health Reform: From Franklin D. Roosevelt to Barack Obama, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 1097, 1098 (June 2010) (“A fatal mistake of the Clinton administration was its long delay in 
getting a health reform bill to Congress.”).   
27 See id. at 1097 (“Many observers have criticized the Obama administration for ‘over-learning’ the lessons 
of the Clinton administration and not sending a more fully fleshed plan to Congress.”).  
28 See id. at 1098.  
29 Id.; see also Julie Rovner, ‘You Can’t Have Perfection’: Lawmakers Who Forged ACA Look Back, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 27, 2018), https://khn.org/news/you-cant-have-perfection-lawmakers-who-
forged-aca-look-back/ [https://perma.cc/46S5-CBYS] (discussion with the five Congressional committee 
leaders: Max Baucus (D-Mont.), Chris Dodd (D-Conn.), Henry Waxman (D-Calif.), George Miller (D-
Calif.) and Sander Levin (D-Mich.) who stewarded the ACA toward its passage in 2010).  
30 See Morone, supra note 26, at 1098 (regarding the impact of public voices).  
31 Id. at 1096. 
32 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/photos-and-video/video/2010-state-union-
address#transcript [https://perma.cc/Q876-2QRB]. 
33 See Lawrence R. Jacobs, What Health Reform Teaches Us about American Politics, 43 POL. SCI. & POL. 
619, 622 (Oct. 1, 2010) (discussing Obama’s role in promoting health reform and refortifying the cause in 
early 2010); see also LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL, HEALTH CARE REFORM AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 101-121 (Oxford U. Press, 2d ed. 2012) (discussing impacts 
of Kennedy’s death and the election of Scott Brown). 
34 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) [hereinafter 
Affordable Care Act] (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).  
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starting in 2019.35 The employer mandate requires most large employers to provide 
adequate, affordable health insurance or pay a tax penalty.36 The Medicaid 
expansion—made a state option by NFIB v. Sebelius—broadens that federal-state 
program from one that covers categories of low-income citizens to one that covers all 
otherwise uninsured citizens with incomes below 138% of the federal poverty level.37 
Finally, the marketplace protections provide regulatory and technical supports for 
those not offered statutorily adequate, affordable coverage by the government or an 
employer, and provide financial support for low- and middle-income purchasers.38 
The ACA takes a fundamentally conservative approach grounded in support 
for private markets and employer-provided health insurance. Indeed, while the debate 
over the ACA legislation raged, Senator Kennedy allowed that one of his profound 
regrets was that he had opposed Nixon’s health reform efforts while holding out for a 
single-payor approach.39 
The Nixonian approach was like the ACA’s, but broader, and overall more 
progressive, with more federal government regulation and subsidization.40 It would 
have required most employers to provide health insurance for their full-time 
employees.41 It would have federally defined the required benefits. And it would have 
established a government-grounded, subsidized program for all uninsured Americans, 
regardless of income.42 That the ACA falls to the right of the Nixonian plan reinforces 
the practical difficulty—and likely impossibility—of replacing the ACA with a more 
market-oriented arrangement that achieves similar levels of access to comprehensive 
insurance. It also highlights the long-standing ideological hurdles to adoption of a 
single-payer, Medicare-for-all type model. 
Indeed, President Trump’s use of the chief executive’s megaphone might, 
ironically, work to shift the conservative option in a Nixonian direction. “We have to 
                                                 
35
 Affordable Care Act § 1501, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012), amended by Act to Provide for Reconciliation 
Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 
115-97 § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092 (2017) (originally introduced as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017); 
see also Texas v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 3d 665 (N.D. Tex. 2018), filing appeal (5th Cir. filed Jan. 7, 
2019) (holding that without the tax penalty the individual mandate lacks constitutional grounding and that 
thus the entire law must fall, and entering a stay).  
36  26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012). 
37 Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(4), 124 Stat. 119, 274 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012)) (amending § 1902 of the Social Security Act); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. 
(NFIB) v. Sibelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575-88 (2012) (plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional the 
requirement of Medicaid expansion). 
38 See generally Affordable Care Act §§ 1001-1563; Affordable Care Act § 1101, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012) 
(establishing a temporary high-risk health insurance pool program); Affordable Care Act § 1201, 42 U.S.C. 
§300gg-3 (2012) (prohibiting preexisting condition exclusions); see also Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. 
Oversight, Health Insurance Market Reforms, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms/index.html (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2018) (summarizing 13 market reforms). 
39 Jonathan Alter, Teddy on Teddy, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2009, at 74. See also THE BOSTON GLOBE, LAST 
LION: THE FALL AND RISE OF TED KENNEDY 323 (Peter S. Canellos ed., 2009). 
40 See Shanoor Seervai & David Blumenthal, M.D., Lessons on Universal Coverage from an Unexpected 
Advocate: Richard Nixon, COMMONWEALTH FUND: BLOG (Nov. 2, 2017), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2017/lessons-universal-coverage-unexpected-advocate-richard-
nixon (noting that the “two main pillars of Nixon’s plan were an employer mandate and expanded coverage 
for the poor”). 
41 Id. 
42 BLUMENTHAL & MORONE, supra note 6, at 230–247 (“Nixon changed the health care discussion in the 
United States. Today’s reformers all stand in his shadow. Ultimately, however, Nixon could not change 
himself. His health care plans went down with him amid the wreckage of Watergate.”). 
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repeal Obamacare, and it can be—and — and it can be replaced with something much 
better for everybody,” candidate Trump said in 2015.43 “Let it be for everybody. But 
much better and much less expensive for people and for the government.”44 
As president, he has repeated these exhortations to repeal the ACA and 
replace it with something “terrific” that would cover everybody and save money all 
around.45 To date he has been unsuccessful at wrangling Congress to repeal the law, 
apart from zeroing out the individual mandate’s tax penalty. “So,” President Trump 
told a Values Voter Summit, “we’re going a little different route.”46  The following 
section describes that different, non-legislative route to repeal. 
 
III. WITH MEGAPHONE, LANDLINE, AND PEN, PRESIDENT TRUMP 
ATTEMPTS AN EXECUTIVE REPEAL  
In addition to a megaphone, the Resolute desk also holds a landline and pen. 
In the current era, these tools—the president’s formal powers of statutory 
implementation—have assumed an outsized role in shaping the ACA. “I’ve got a pen 
and I’ve got a phone,” President Obama declared in early 2014. “And I can use that 
pen to sign executive orders and take executive actions and administrative actions that 
move the ball forward.”47 He was referring to congressional gridlock generally, but as 
to the ACA specifically, the intransigence was profound. Following the 2010 shift in 
power, Congress has taken more than 50 votes to repeal the law; as of early 2019, the 
needed statutory refinement has not been in the offing.48 
“Since Congress can’t get its act together on HealthCare,” President Trump 
tweeted after the failure of 2017 repeal effort, “I will be using the power of the pen to 
give great HealthCare to many people—FAST.”49 As law professors Lisa Manheim 
and Kathryn Watts stress in their comprehensive book THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER, the president’s tools of executive orders, regulatory oversight, and 
                                                 
43 Ryan Koronowski, 68 Times Trump Promised to Repeal Obamacare: The White House Says It’s Already 
Moving On, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 24, 2017, 8:28 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/trump-promised-to-
repeal-obamacare-many-times-ab9500dad31e/ [https://perma.cc/R79F-NGSY]. 
44 Id. 
45 Bob Bryan, Trump Is Making a Massive Promise about His Obamacare Replacement, BUS. INSIDER, 
(Jan. 26, 2017, 1:08 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-obamacare-promise-2017-1 
[https://perma.cc/3ESD-M5L7]. 
46 President Donald J. Trump, Remarks by President Trump at the 2017 Values Voter Summit (Oct. 13, 
2017) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
2017-values-voter-summit/).  
47 Tamara Keith, Wielding a Pen and a Phone, Obama Goes It Alone, NPR (Jan. 24, 2014, 3:36 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2014/01/20/263766043/wielding-a-pen-and-a-phone-obama-goes-it-alone 
[https://perma.cc/PD7E-WUKZ]; Obama on Executive Actions: ‘I’ve Got a Pen And I’ve Got A Phone’, 
CBS WASH. (Jan. 14, 2014, 1:05 PM), https://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/01/14/obama-on-executive-
actions-ive-got-a-pen-and-ive-got-a-phone/ [http://cbsloc.al/JYNE7G]. 
48 See Tessa Berenson, Reminder: The House Voted to Repeal Obamacare More than 50 Times, TIME (Mar. 
24, 2017), http://time.com/4712725/ahca-house-repeal-votes-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/963D-DN3L] 
(noting that the House has voted over 50 times on repealing or amending the ACA); Sean Sullivan, 




(discussing congressional Republicans’ efforts to repeal the ACA). 
49 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 10, 2017, 2:30 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/917698839846576130?lang=en [https://perma.cc/JDB9-3UZ7]. 
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enforcement discretion are not magic wands.50 They are bounded by Constitutional 
authority, statutory delegation, regulatory requirements, and other limiting forces. 
These limiting forces have a lot to contend with as President Trump has made robust 
use of the chief executive’s toolkit to undermine a wide range of ACA provisions, 
particularly, as discussed here, the marketplace protections. 
 
A. THE INDIVIDUAL COVERAGE POOL AND THE ACA’S PROTECTIVE DIKE 
The ACA creates a dike protecting the individual coverage pool.51 Behind the 
dike swim those without other coverage options such as an employer plan, Medicare, 
Medicaid, Tricare, or the Indian Health Service. Those in the pool include people who 
work for themselves, for small businesses, in the gig economy, and as independent 
contractors; it includes farmers, artists, students, and early retirees, among others. This 
is a relatively small group compared to those who have coverage through an employer 
or the government.  But the pool is crucial, for the covered individuals and for the 
health care system. 
The individual coverage dike is built with interlinked protective bricks. These 
varied bricks highlight the technical complexity of regulating the “health care 
octopus.”52 Foundationally, the ACA prohibits individual insurance plans from 
considering a person’s health in the decision whether to offer them a plan, its coverage 
terms, or its price.53 In addition to these pre-existing condition (“PEC”) protections, 
the plans must cover a defined set of “essential health benefits,” pay for preventative 
services without cost-sharing, limit out-of-pocket costs, and impose no annual or 
lifetime maximum.54 
The federal financial supports and the individual mandate aim to ensure that 
the coverage pool is broad, including in any given year those who need a lot of health 
care and those who need only a little. A broad pool, with the sick and the well, should 
moderate premiums and support stable insurance options offered by private 
companies. Federal financial supports are of two types: sliding-scale premium 
subsidies and sliding-scale cost-sharing reductions (“CSRs”).55 The premium subsidies 
(technically they are advanceable, refundable tax credits) peter out at 400% of the 
federal poverty level (FPL).56 In 2018, that was about $50,000 for an individual or 
$100,000 for a family of four.57 The CSRs, which reduce out-of-pocket costs such as 
deductibles and co-pays, peter out at 250% FPL.58 
                                                 
50 LISA MANHEIM & KATHRYN WATT, THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE 
LAW 58 (2018) (“The President’s Toolkit”).  
51 For this extended metaphor, I gratefully acknowledge Jane Beyer, Senior Health Policy Advisor, 
Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner. See also infra Section IV (regarding state fingers 
plugging the dike holes created by Trump administration actions). 
52 BLUMENTHAL & MORONE, supra note 6, at 11. 
53 Sallie Thieme Sanford, The Struggle to Bury Pre-Existing Condition Consideration, 7 ST. LOUIS J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 405, 410–412 (2014). 
54 Id. 
55 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 18071. 
56 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010). 
57 Office of the Assistant Sec’y for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Federal Poverty Guidelines Use to 
Determine Financial Eligibility for Certain Federal Programs, U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS., https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines [https://perma.cc/ZR9V-8TZJ] (last visited Mar. 26, 
2019). 
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Although the average premium cost paid by a subsidized individual was about 
$75 a month in 2018,59 costs continue to be a serious problem for many purchasers. 
Deductibles are often high, sometimes approaching the maximum annual out-of-
pocket costs, which in 2018 were about $7,400 for an individual.60 And for those who 
make too much or too little for a premium subsidy, purchasing a plan can be a huge 
financial burden.61 This financial burden can be especially galling in regions where 
plan choices are few and characterized by a limited network of physicians and 
hospitals. And, of course, costs are a concern for the federal government; marketplace 
funding and Medicaid expansion are the two aspects of the ACA that impose the most 
costs on the federal government. 
 
B. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND MANAGERIAL ACTIONS 
Throughout his presidential campaign, candidate Trump made a repeated, 
fervent pledge to “immediately repeal and replace Obamacare,”62 promising action on 
day one of his administration. Indeed, shortly after being sworn in as president, while 
still at the Capitol, President Trump signed an executive order to “minimize the 
unwarranted economic and regulatory burdens” of the ACA.63 It directed federal 
agencies to “exercise all authority and discretion available to them to waive, defer, 
grant exemptions from, or delay the implementation of any provision or requirement of 
the Act that would impose a fiscal burden.”64 As discussed in this section and the next, 
                                                 
59 Health Insurance Exchanges 2018 Open Enrollment Period Final Report, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS. (APR. 3, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/health-insurance-exchanges-
2018-open-enrollment-period-final-report [https://perma.cc/U5EM-6XP9] [hereinafter CMS.gov Final 
Report]; see also Rachel Fehr et al., How ACA Marketplace Premiums Are Changing by County in 2019, 




AYOA6Cjlgbpnw&_hsmi=67700339 [https://perma.cc/2WGS-JNWC]; see infra Section IV.A, for a 
discussion of the complex reasons why the average monthly premium paid by a subsidized individual was 
lower (by about $25) in 2017 and 2018 compared to the first years of the marketplaces. 
60 Stephen Miller, HHS Sets 2018 Health Plan Out-of-Pocket Maximums, HRNEWS (Dec. 22, 2016), 
https://ezproxy.bu.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/185171748 
4?accountid=9676 [https://perma.cc/7VTP-Q797]. 
61 Those with incomes below 100% FPL or above 400% FPL are not entitled to any premium subsidies (or 
cost-sharing reductions). The ACA as written intends that those at the lower income level be covered under 
a large employer plan or Medicaid, which the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision made a state option. As of 
mid-2018, 33 states and the District of Columbia had expanded their Medicaid programs; those that had not 
include populous Texas and Florida. See Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/slide/current-status-of-the-
medicaid-expansion-decision/ [https://perma.cc/S9G9-3ER8]; see infra Section IV.B for discussion of 
Medicaid expansion and the 2018 mid-term election. 




64-days-he-pledged-it-in-one%2F [https://perma.cc/C8TR-PFMK]; see also Philip Bump, It’s True Trump 
Didn’t Pledge Obamacare Repeal in 64 Days. He Pledged It in One, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/03/24/its-true-trump-didnt-pledge-obamacare-
repeal-in-64-days-he-pledged-it-in-one/?utm_term=.128a7927b2c5 [https://perma.cc/H8AU-5FPC] (noting 
President Trump’s repeated pledge to repeal ACA immediately). 
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executive branch agencies have played a central role in advancing President Trump’s 
anti-ACA agenda. 
Health care is one of the most heavily regulated industries, and the ACA 
contains hundreds of sections directing that an agency head “may” or “shall” do one 
thing or another. Furthermore, as part of the complex dance of federalism, key aspects 
of the law’s practical access functions are left to both federal and state agencies, often 
with broadly or awkwardly worded language. Primary federal agencies here are the 
Departments of Treasury, Labor, and Health and Human Services (HHS), especially 
the latter’s Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS). The “M” in CMS is 
already a placeholder for two words, but given the center’s workload, it really ought to 
be three and formally renamed the Center for Medicare, Medicaid, and Marketplace 
Services. 
From its earliest days, HHS undertook managerial-type actions intended to 
discourage sign-ups through the marketplaces. President Trump appointed 
Representative Tom Price, a fierce critic of the ACA, to lead HHS.65 In 2017, Price 
and then his successor, Alex Azar, slashed the budgets for marketplace advertising (by 
90%) and consumer assistance (by 40%), shortened the time for the next open 
enrollment (from three months to 45 days), and removed helpful information from the 
CMS website. Indeed, the website came instead to feature videos of 23 people who 
described being harmed by the ACA.66 
President Trump also destabilized the marketplaces by sowing uncertainty as 
to whether insurance companies would continue to receive CSR payments. In 
accordance with statutory direction, the IRS had made these payments monthly, 
reimbursing insurance companies to the tune of billions of dollars a year.67 Just as 
frequently, the president and administration officials threatened to stop the 
reimbursements.68 
They were empowered to do so by the outcome of a 2014 lawsuit brought by 
the Republican-controlled House of Representatives. The House argued that insurers 
could not lawfully be reimbursed for the CSR payments because Congress had not 
specifically appropriated the funds to do so.69 The district court agreed.70 The Obama 
administration appealed, and that appeal was pending when President Trump took 
office.71 The appeal remained on hold as the president and agency officials publicly 
                                                 
65 Amy Goldstein & Philip Rucker, Trump names Rep. Tom Price as next HHS secretary, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/11/28/trump-to-name-rep-tom-
price-as-next-hhs-secretary/ [https://perma.cc/HB7Q-Z786]. 
66 Audrey Carlsen & Haeyoun Park, The Same Agency That Runs Obamacare Is Using Taxpayer Money to 
Undermine It, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/04/us/hhs-anti-
obamacare-campaign.html [https://perma.cc/9G2G-EEFW]; see also Timothy Jost, CMS Cuts ACA 
Advertising By 90 Percent Amid Other Cuts to Enrollment Outreach, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 31, 
2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170901.061790/full/ [https://perma.cc/F9N5-
WL9Z] (noting that CMS will focus outreach and marketing on digital messages). 
67 President's Fiscal Year 2018 Health Care Proposals: Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin., 115th Cong. 
(2017). I DO NOT HAVE ACCESS TO THIS TO CONFIRM WHAT IT IS OR THE PINPOINT BELOW 
68 Id. at 59.  CINDY IF YOU DON’T HAVE A WAY TO CONFIRM I CAN ASK THE EDITORS TO 
69 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 174-176 (D.D.C. 2016). 
70 Id.   
71 Katie Keith, States’ Lawsuit Over Cost-Sharing Reductions is Dismissed, HEALTH AFF. BLOG 
(July 19, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180719.822849/full/ 
[https://perma.cc/5CQR-SLTD]. One of the best resources for tracking the myriad federal implementation 
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considered dropping it and stopping the payments (while also pressing Congress to 
repeal the ACA).72 
“Obamacare is dead next month if it doesn’t get that money,” President 
Trump said in April 2017, as insurers were preparing to submit their rates for the fall 
enrollment season.73 Premiums were already slated to go up substantially, with 
insurers exiting some markets. In no small part, insurers were responding to the chaos 
and uncertainty surrounding the then-pending repeal efforts and President Trump’s 
comments. Insurers also explained that previous enrollees had been sicker and older 
than predicted; and there is evidence that insurers may have underpriced their offerings 
in the first years, hoping to lock in purchasers. In addition, a transitional federal 
reinsurance program ended in 2016 — thus 2017 was the first year that insurers would 
lack a “safety net” for very high cost claims.74   
After months of threats, on October 12, 2017, President Trump cancelled 
future CSR payments.75 The Department of Justice dropped its appeal of the 
underlying district court decision. This was on the eve of open enrollment to purchase 
plans effective in 2018. As described in Section IV, creative actions by states 
cushioned the impact of this decision.  
But states could not fully counter the uncertainty – itself a threat to coverage 
stability – sowed by this and contemporaneous federal agency regulatory and litigative 
actions. Uncertainty is itself a threat in part because the arrangement relies on private 
insurance company participation (there is no federal “public option”). In considering 
whether to offer a plan in an area during an upcoming open enrollment season, 
companies will weigh the financial risks and benefits, factoring in the number and 
characteristics of those likely to purchase a plan, as well as the expected payment 
streams and administrative work, among other factors. 
 
C. AGENCY REGULATION AND LITIGATION STRATEGY 
Federal agencies play a key role in advancing the president’s agenda, as is 
evident here. By executive order in the fall of 2017, President Trump directed the 
revision of existing regulations to, among other changes, allow expanded access to 
short-term, limited duration plans (STLDs) and to association health plans (AHPs).76 
About a year later, final rules became effective, shooting significant holes in the dike.77 
                                                 
72 Erin Raftery & Amy Lotven, Court Grants House Wish to put CSR Case on Hold Until February, 
INSIDEHEALTHPOLICY.COM’S DAILY BRIEF (Dec. 6, 2016). 
73 Michael C. Bender, Louise Radnofsky & Peter Nicholas, Trump Threatens to Withhold Payments to 
Insurers to Press Democrats on Health Bill, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12, 2017, 5:06 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-threatens-to-withhold-payments-to-insurers-to-press-democrats-on-
health-bill-1492029844 [https://perma.cc/EU5P-RRRZ]. 
74 See Section IV B, infra, for a discussion of state attempts, using section 1332 waivers to reestablish 
reinsurance programs.  
75 Keith, CSR, supra note 72. 
76 Promoting Healthcare Choice and Competition Across the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,813, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 48385 (Oct. 12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9PMX-26JL]. Other proposed changes to similar effect include 
revisions to the regulations concerning Health Reimbursement Arrangements.  
77 Katie Keith, The Short-Term, Limited-Duration Coverage Final Rule: The Background, The Content, And 
What Could Come Next, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180801.169759/full/ [https://perma.cc/AJN2-N55S] 
hereinafter Keith Short-Term, Limited-Duration Coverage] (explaining STLD rule); see also Katie Keith, 
Final Rule Rapidly Eases Restrictions On Non-ACA-Compliant Association Health Plans, HEALTH AFF. 
BLOG (June 21, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180621.671483/full/ 
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Both coverage vehicles, which CMS promoted, would be expected to appeal to, and 
thus draw out, younger, healthier people, particularly those who do not qualify for 
subsidized coverage. With older, less healthy people remaining in the pool, premiums 
would be expected to soar. 
STLD plans can exclude coverage for maternity, prescription medications, 
and mental health treatment (among other essential health benefits covered by 
marketplace plans). 78 They can have lifetime and annual limits. 79 And, in 
contravention of the PEC protections, can consider a person’s health status in 
determining whether to offer a plan, its benefits, and its terms.80 Under Obama-era 
regulations, STLD plans could last for only three months and could not be renewed; 
this jibed with an individual mandate provision that allowed for a three-month gap in 
qualifying coverage in any calendar year.81 
Under the new rules, STLD plans can last for 364 days and can be renewed—
at the insurer’s option—two times (for a total term of just under three years).82 In 
addition, nothing in the rules prevents a person from thereafter buying a new STLD 
plan, making these skimpier plans a potentially ongoing source of coverage. (Though, 
of course, pregnancy, disease or injury might mean a new plan is unavailable, 
unaffordable, or unhelpful.) To similar effect, the AHP rules both allow more people 
to form an “association” and reduce regulation of association-sponsored insurance 
plans.83  
In late 2018, aiming to further expand the reach of these skimpier options, 
CMS relaxed the requirements for states to obtain waivers from compliance with key 
ACA provisions.84  Waivers of this sort are known as “section 1332 waivers” in 
reference to the ACA provision that authorizes them. In a guidance document, CMS 
announced that for 2019 and subsequent years, the agency would be receptive to 
waiver requests that enabled federal subsidy support for the newly authorized, 
skimpier plans.85 Notably, this action was not a rulemaking, but rather a form of 
subregulatory activity. Although a mechanically easier process for the agency, any 
subregulatory activity needs to comport with its statutory underpinnings. This 
guidance arguably violates the ACA’s subsidy authorization and waiver criteria. 
Standing and ripeness questions, however, present challenges to litigating the legality 
of the waiver guidance or any subsequent waiver approvals.86  
These and related agency actions shoot holes in the ACA’s protective dike. If 
they persist, they can be expected to drive marketplace enrollment down and premiums 
                                                 
78 Keith, Short-Term, Limited-Duration Coverage, supra note 78 (explaining STLD rule). 
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81 Id.   
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[https://perma.cc/UCE3-4ZWW]. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3345293
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3345293 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE  111 
 
up. This risks a “death spiral” of the type experienced in the 1990s when similar state-
level reforms were undone, and insurers abandoned markets.87 
The skimpier plans do address profound concerns about the unsustainably 
high cost of health coverage for many people, particularly those who are older, rural, 
and/or make more than $50,000 a year.88 But they do so to the detriment of those who 
will end up needing expensive health care because of illness, injury, or pregnancy. 
And they threaten the stability of the overall system. As discussed in Section IV, infra, 
states have emerged as a key institutional force working to constrain the president’s 
power, including by state-based measures to hold down premiums and encourage 
enrollment. 
Finally, the administration’s litigation strategy further undermines the 
marketplace protections. As described above, the administration dropped the Obama-
era appeal of the district court’s CSR decision. Moreover, beginning early 2018, in 
Texas v. United States, the administration has declined to defend the constitutionality 
of the ACA, arguing instead for a remedy that would strip PEC and related protections 
from the law.89 Twenty Republican states’ attorneys general or governors filed Texas 
v. United States in response to the December 2017 tax law that zeroed out the 
individual mandate’s tax penalty. 
Without the tax penalty, the plaintiffs argue, a key linchpin of the law lacks 
constitutional grounding and thus the entire ACA—from Medicaid expansion to menu 
labeling—must be thrown out.90 Sixteen Democratic states’ attorneys general or 
governors intervened to argue for the law’s constitutionality and, as a fallback 
position, for a tailored approach to severability, limited to the mandate.91 In late 2018, 
the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and then stayed, pending appeal, its 
decision to throw out the entire law.92 
The individual mandate may not, in fact, prove to be operationally essential, 
at least at this point in the ACA’s implementation. Once results from the 2018 open 
enrollment season are analyzed, it is possible that the lack of a tax penalty will prove 
to have been a minor issue in purchasing decisions. Although enrollment is down 
overall, it is up in some states, and higher than many experts expected given the 
attempted executive repeal and tax penalty removal.93 After several years of 
                                                 
87 King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2482-2484 (2015). See also Sallie Thieme Sanford, Mind the Gap: Basic 
Health Along the ACA’s Coverage Continuum, 17 MD. J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 101, 103–105 (2014) 
(describing near-collapse of the individual market in Washington State in the late 1990’s after repeal of 
contentious mandates and retention of consumer protections).  
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 The ACA allows older people to be charged up to three times as much as younger people for the same 
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account for the age-adjusted premium for the benchmark plan. Rural people often face higher premium costs 
than city dwellers because there are typically fewer insurers competing for a smaller number of people, who 
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dramatically reduced uninsurance rates, perhaps coverage has become the expectation 
and people are sticking with individual insurance. Marketplace affordability may prove 
to be the crucial factor. And that is promoted for low- and moderate- income 
purchasers by premium subsidies and cost-sharing reductions, which continue for now. 
The attempted executive repeal did not destroy the marketplaces in 2018. 
That year all counties had at least one insurer offering coverage.94 Costs, while higher 
than they would have been without the administration’s destabilizing actions, appear 
generally manageable from a system perspective, if not as to many individuals and 
families.95 However, the newly authorized cheaper, skimpier plans were not generally 
available in the fall of 2018. The tax penalty repeal had not yet gone into effect. And 
states have not yet acted upon the expanded 1332 waiver option.  
Thus, it is too soon to know the ultimate impacts of President Trump’s 
attempt to repeal and replace the ACA by “a little different route.”96 This uncertainty is 
compounded by the rising prominence of two constraining forces: the states, and the 
public. 
 
IV. STATE ACTORS CONSTRAIN EXECUTIVE POWER WITH 
MANAGERIAL, LITIGATIVE, LEGISLATIVE, AND REGULATORY WORK 
States have emerged as a key institutional force constraining the president’s 
power to repeal the ACA’s marketplace protections. As discussed in the prior section, 
the ACA establishes a dike protecting the individual coverage pool. The president 
continues to shoot holes in this dike. And by zeroing out the individual mandate tax 
penalty, Congress hammered a crack through it. The fingers plugging those holes and 
the feet bracing the crack belong, at least for now, to the states. 
Notably, these are not only blue fingers and feet. Some of the actions have 
been distinctly bipartisan, such as the facilitation of “silver loading” to counter the 
president’s withdrawal of CSR payments. Litigation brought by Democratic-leaning 
states takes a historically atypical position in aiming to bolster federal power and 
nationally uniform rules. As these lawsuits play out, the federal courts might patch a 
hole here and there or fashion a truss. Ultimately, though, it is hard to imagine the 
battered individual coverage dike holding strong without Congressional action to 
plaster and solidify the walls. 
 
A. STATE MANAGEMENT AND LITIGATION 
Within its federal framework, the ACA features a significant role for the 
states in marketplace management and Medicaid expansion. The Supreme Court’s 
2012 decision in NFIB v. Sebelius expanded these roles. After tracking the 
marketplace and Medicaid aspects of health care federalism from 2012–2017, law 
professors Abbe R. Gluck and Nicole Huberfeld conclude that “there have been waves 
of engagement and estrangement between states and the federal government” over 
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ACA implementation.97 The process, they write, has been dynamic, pragmatic, and 
negotiated; it has been marked by both intrastate politics and also intergovernmental 
creativity. Notably, state agency-level efforts to cooperatively support robust ACA 
coverage often belied political messaging from state leaders.98 
The complicated dynamics of health care federalism also play out in many 
states’ more recent role as a constraint on President Trump’s efforts to undercut the 
marketplaces. One example revolves around the CSR saga described in Section III B. 
More than a dozen states intervened in the underlying lawsuit, taking up the Obama 
administration’s advocacy in defense of continuing the payments.99 
Days after President Trump announced he was cutting off the CSR payments 
to insurers, California and 18 other liberal-leaning states (including the District of 
Columbia) filed suit.100 This action, the states argued, violated the ACA and would 
raise insurance premiums, destabilize the individual market, and harm state residents. 
Ruling quickly, the court denied a preliminary injunction to keep the payments 
flowing, concluding that much of the harm had been quickly offset by “silver 
loading.”101 
Silver loading is a creative, kludgy workaround adopted by state insurance 
commissioners across the country in response to the threatened, and then actual, CSR 
payment cut-off. Many insurance commissioners—in red states and in blue—allowed, 
or in some cases required, insurers to apply the full CSR-related premium increase to 
silver plans, rather than spreading the increase across their plans of all metal levels. 
Part of the logic is that the CSRs (the reduced out-of-pocket costs) are available only 
to income-eligible purchasers who buy a silver plan (rather than bronze, gold, or 
platinum). Much of the logic, though, is to hold down costs for other purchasers and to 
promote stability. 
Thus, on the 2017 and 2018 marketplaces, silver plans in many markets had, 
counterintuitively, higher premiums than did gold plans. And, significantly, subsidized 
purchasers had higher federal premium subsidies, as these are pegged to a silver 
plan.102 Those who made too much or too little to qualify for a subsidy and wanted a 
silver plan faced huge increases but could often find good rates for other plans (though 
perhaps with undesired tradeoffs). Marketplace pricing was quirky and complicated; 
but states’ silver-loading decisions helped maintain viable markets.103 In other 
managerial-type functions, many states increased their marketing and outreach in the 
face of drastic federal cuts in both those areas. 
In addition, states and localities have been active litigators in defense of the 
ACA. As noted in the prior section, 16 Democratic attorneys general or governors 
intervened in Texas v. United States to argue in defense of the constitutionality of the 
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ACA, and for a tailored view of severability.104 And in direct response to this case, the 
Maryland attorney general sued in federal court there seeking a declaration that the 
ACA remains constitutional and enforceable. The state is directly harmed, Maryland 
argues, by the administration’s multifaceted actions to undermine the ACA.105 Similar 
arguments are advanced by four cities—Baltimore, Chicago, Cincinnati and 
Columbus—in a lawsuit also filed in district court in Maryland. In a novel argument, 
the cities argue that President Trump is violating his constitutional duty to “take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed.”106 
In addition, states have judicially challenged Trump administration 
regulations aimed at expanding the availability of less expensive, less comprehensive, 
less protective insurance plans through the AHP regulations. The plaintiffs argue that 
the regulations are arbitrary and capricious, violate the ACA, and violate the federal 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).107 
As these cases wend their way through the federal courts, they will highlight 
the judicial system’s role in checking the president’s power. The question of the 
ACA’s current constitutionality seems likely to be appealed, and perhaps taken up by 
the Supreme Court, spotlighting the odd situation of most of the states engaged in 
litigation, effectively against each other, over the authority of the federal government 
to regulate their citizens. 
The regulatory challenges before the courts involve more typical questions of 
Chevron deference, statutory authority, and Administrative Procedures Act 
compliance. They also, though, feature the unusual situation of states arguing for 
federal rather than state regulation. This runs counter to states’ more typical assertions 
of state authority and autonomy. It also reflects the reality that state-level backfilling 
here is a fragmented, piecemeal, and ultimately unsustainable endeavor. 
 
B. STATE LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 
Several states also have enacted legislation or adopted rules aiming to plug 
executive branch-created holes in the individual marketplace dike. A couple of states 
have enacted individual mandates tied to state taxes, and others are considering doing 
so.108 For states without an income tax, enforcement options are limited. And a key 
legislative question concerns what qualifies as satisfactory health insurance for 
purposes of a state mandate. To this point, states have enacted state law definitions of 
required benefits and pre-existing condition protections in line with the ACA.109 The 
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reach of these statutes is complicated and limited by federal pre-emption under 
ERISA. 
Regulation in some states also works to cabin the impact of the dramatically 
expanded federal rules regarding short-term limited duration (“STLD”) plans, which 
allow for PEC restrictions and limited benefits.110 States retain the ability to regulate 
these plans. California banned them; Washington State allows them, but only for a 
non-renewable three-month term and with detailed notice to purchasers.111 
There are also examples of states working with the Trump administration to 
shore up their marketplaces. Several states successfully obtained section 1332 waivers 
to use federal money for state-designed reinsurance arrangements.112 These 
arrangements – modeled on the ACA’s temporary program that expired in 2016 – 
spread the financial burden of particularly high cost patients.113 This reduces insurer 
risk, and thus moderates premiums.  
Section 1332 waivers, a feature of the ACA also known as “Wyden 
Waivers,”114 first became available in 2017. Alaska used one to draw down federal 
dollars in support of a reinsurance program; the program successfully reduced 
premiums on Alaska’s notoriously high-cost marketplace.115 Other states have copied 
Alaska’s model and received similar 1332 waivers. (The financial arrangement is 
technically somewhat easier in Alaska than in other states; one reason is that nearly all 
of the Last Frontier’s marketplace purchasers receive a premium subsidy, a higher 
percentage than in other states.)116 
In 2017, Senators Patty Murray (D-Wash.) and Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.) 
worked on bipartisan legislation that featured several marketplace stabilization 
measures sought by the states. These included a federal reinsurance program, 
restoration of the CSR payments, and funding for advertising and assistance. Although 
there were indications of bipartisan and presidential support, the bill faltered and was 
not brought up for a vote.117 
Pressure from state actors and the consequences of pending judicial decisions 
might spur Congressional revision and refinement of the ACA. This is somewhat more 
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likely given Democratic control of the House in 2019-2020. And it is bolstered by 
public opinion, which is shifting towards solid support for government-grounded 
coverage options and pre-existing condition protections. 
 
V. PUBLIC VOICES CONSTRAIN FUTURE OPTIONS, WITH GROWING 
SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT-GROUNDED COVERAGE AND PEC 
PROTECTIONS  
Public voices present a growing constraint on the possibility of a full 
executive repeal of the ACA’s access provisions. These voices do not directly limit 
executive action, as could institutional actors such as Congress, courts, and state 
governments. Indirectly, however, public opinion — particularly its expression at the 
ballot box — blunts the impacts of presidential phone and pen.  
The ACA, despite polling more favorably than not in 2017 and 2018, remains 
highly polarizing. This polarization persists despite solidifying support, across party 
lines, for central features of the law, including pre-existing condition protections and 
government-grounded coverage options. This shift in opinion was reflected in political 
messaging during the 2018 midterm elections, and in its results. Voters in three states 
went around legislative and/or gubernatorial intransigence and adopted Medicaid 
expansion by initiative. In other states, voters elected governors who vowed to press 
for expansion.  
A. PERSONAL STORIES AND PUBLIC OPINION  
With this issue, the personal readily becomes political. Americans’ stories 
about health care coverage and access challenges date back at least a century. 
Traditional and social media have amplified them, under both Presidents Obama and 
Trump. When “repeal and replace” seemed an imminent possibility under President 
Trump and a Republican Congress, the voices urging protection of the ACA 
reverberated from town hall attendees, expensively ill patients, media stars, and 
nascent politicians, among many others. 
Tennessee teacher Jessi Bohon’s Town Hall comments ricocheted around 
social media. “As a Christian,” Bohon said, “my whole philosophy is to pull up the 
unfortunate.”118 She explained that this philosophy grounded her support for the 
individual mandate, and her concerns that the then-pending Republican replacement 
bill would mean that “[w]e are effectively punishing our sickest people.”119 Multiple 
sclerosis patient Kim Adams joined the chorus of activists who had gained health 
coverage because of the ACA and spoke out in various fora about what its repeal 
would mean to them. Describing her time of living with MS and without coverage, she 
said, “I lost three years of being able to care for my daughter, worrying the whole time, 
living in constant panic.” 120 
Tonight Show host Jimmy Kimmel’s on-air monologue about his infant son’s 
frightening and expensive surgery for a congenital heart defect inspired the “Jimmy 
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Kimmel test” as a lodestar for evaluating ACA replacement options.121 “If your baby is 
going to die and it doesn’t have to, it shouldn’t matter how much money you make,” 
Kimmel said. “I think that’s something that whether you’re a Republican or a 
Democrat or something else, we all agree on that, right?”122 And the threat to the ACA 
inspired nascent politicians, including pediatrician and diabetic Kim Schrier (D-Wash.) 
who in 2018 successfully ran on health reform to win a previously Republican-held 
U.S. House seat.123 
In some ways, the popular source and impacts of these stories mirror the Tea 
Party ascendance in the summer of 2009. At that time, nearly all major interest groups 
were allied in support of the key elements of what would become the ACA. The 
populist, conservative Tea Party movement amplified individual voices strongly 
opposed to an expanded government role in health care. Those voices helped deliver 
the Democratic shellacking in the 2010 mid-terms.124 
Six months before this consequential election, and just after the ACA’s 
enactment, the Kaiser Family Foundation began asking Americans every few months 
whether they had a “generally favorable or generally unfavorable view” of the “health 
reform bill signed into law in 2010.”125 What Americans have had, generally, is a 
divided view. Over the years, close to the same number disfavored the law as favored 
it, and few lacked an opinion. 
Indeed, a notable feature of the Kaiser polls’ display graph over time is how 
closely the red line of unfavorability tracks the blue line of favorability. Over eight 
years of polling, the two are typically separated by no more than a few percentage 
points, occasionally meeting to reflect an even split in opinion. Between January 2013 
and January 2015, the ACA was consistently viewed more unfavorably than not, the 
red line above the blue.126 
As President Trump’s administration and the Republican Congress ramped up 
their threats to the law, however, public opinion decisively shifted. From February 
2017, the month after President Trump’s inauguration, through at least 2018, more 
Americans have consistently expressed support for the ACA as a whole. In August 
2018, 50% of those surveyed had a generally favorable view of the law as a whole, and 
40% a generally unfavorable view.127 
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The Kaiser display graphs’ use of blue for “favorable view” and red for 
“unfavorable view” tracks party affiliation. In the August 2018 poll mentioned above, 
for example, 77% of Democrats (and only 15% of Republicans) approved of the law 
overall. And in a mirror opposite 78% of Republicans (and 17% of Democrats) 
disapproved of the law overall.128  
Many of the ACA’s central aspects, though, poll as overwhelmingly and 
increasingly popular. Polling from late summer of 2018, for example, showed that 
75% of Americans and including a majority of Republicans consider it “very 
important” to maintain the law’s protections for those with pre-existing conditions.129 
Also quite popular among those from both parties were premium subsidies, the ability 
to keep children up to age 26 on large employer plans, and coverage of preventative 
services without cost-sharing. 130 
Polling about the government’s role is also instructive. In 2013, as the four 
M’s of Access were poised to go into effect, 56% of Americans said that it is not the 
government’s responsibility to ensure that all citizens have health care.131 In 2018, that 
had nearly flipped, with 60% averring that this is the government’s responsibility.132 
Political divisions on this point remain significant and reflect complicated perceptions 
of government programs and citizen obligations.133 
 
B. POLITICAL STATEMENTS AND POPULAR INITIATIVES 
Ultimately, though, what impact does public opinion have, whether reflected 
in polling numbers or personal stories? Under conventional theory, it should shift 
policy. In the absence of linked political change, though, it might simply shift rhetoric. 
“[T]he influence of public opinion on government policy,” concluded political 
scientists Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro in 2000, “is less than it has been 
in the past and certainly less than commonly assumed by political pundits and some 
scholars.”134 
They wrote this prior to the battles over the ACA and the modern populist 
movements, but much of their analysis resonates. They argue that elected officials 
often use polling data and other indicia of public opinion more to shape their 
messaging than to shape their legislation. 
The 2018 mid-term election campaigns provided a striking example of this. In 
a stark turn of campaign rhetoric, many Republicans dropped “repeal and replace” 
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calls and campaigned on support for PEC protections, historically the province of 
Democrats. In the weeks leading up to the 2018 midterms, President Trump echoed 
this messaging. “All Republicans support people with pre-existing conditions, and if 
they don’t, they will after I speak to them,” he tweeted. “I am in total support.”135 
Consider, for example a campaign ad by a successful U.S. Senate candidate, 
Republican Josh Hawley, who was then Missouri’s attorney general. “Earlier this year, 
we learned our oldest has a rare chronic disease,” Hawley says in the ad. “Preexisting 
condition. We know what that’s like. I’m Josh Hawley. I support forcing insurance 
companies to cover all preexisting conditions.” At the same time, Hawley was a 
plaintiff in Texas v. United States,136 which aims to throw out the entire ACA, or at 
least its PEC and related coverage protections; he also supported Trump administration 
rules to allow the sale of cheaper, limited-coverage, health status-rated plans which 
threaten the stability of the individual market. Hawley vowed to advance protective 
legislation outside the ACA framework, a drafting challenge that has eluded previous 
Congresses.137 
Regardless whether public opinion ultimately matters, elections do. And this 
very much includes state-level elections. As discussed in Section IV of this paper, 
states have been a significant constraint on the president’s ability to undermine the 
ACA. In this regard, it is state officials, elected and appointed, that take the protective 
actions. It is also state officials, elected and appointed, that take resisting action. State 
legislatures, health care agencies, insurance commissioners, and governors are likely to 
be at the center of ACA implementation debates for the foreseeable future. 
If nothing else, the successful 2018 state Medicaid expansion initiatives will 
ensure that centrality. Voters in Idaho, Nebraska, and Utah approved these direct-to-
the-people measures during the midterm elections. And Maine elected a governor who 
vowed to implement a previous Medicaid expansion initiative that had been blocked 
by her predecessor. These four initiatives are notable examples of popular opinion 
going around gubernatorial and/or legislative ACA opposition.138 
Medicaid is popular, even in states that had not expanded the program prior to 
2018. In an October 2018 poll, 56% of people in the 17 non-expansion states said that 
they favored doing so.139 Reflecting the insight that polling drives messaging, the 2018 
initiative campaigns in Idaho, Nebraska and Utah downplayed the issue’s connection 
to the ACA, which polls much less positively in these Republican-leaning states than 
does Medicaid expansion.140 
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Other states will also be grappling with Medicaid expansion in the 2019 
legislative sessions. Montana voters rejected an initiative that would have taxed 
tobacco to pay for that state’s expansion, which is set to sunset in July 2019 unless the 
legislature comes up with other funding.141 The newly elected governors of Kansas and 
Wisconsin campaigned on expanding the program and might be legislatively 
positioned to do so. All told, in 2019 and 2020, hundreds of thousands more 
Americans are likely to be added to Medicaid from a half dozen red states.142 Unless, 
of course, the plaintiffs prevail in Texas v. United States and the Medicaid expansion is 
thrown out with the rest of the ACA.  
Writing in 2014, political scientist Lawrence Jacobs speculated that as ACA 
implementation proceeded, the law might “spur the formation of organized support for 
health reform from a broad coalition of Americans.”143 That appears to be happening. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The presidential megaphone has long been used, by Republicans and 
Democrats alike, to advocate with the public and with Congress for legislative 
solutions to expand access to high quality health care. President Obama’s success in 
getting the Affordable Care Act enacted in 2010 marked the most consequential step 
towards universal coverage since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.  
President Trump has attempted an executive branch repeal of the ACA, and 
particularly its marketplace protections. He has not yet succeeded, but the threat 
remains substantial. The threat comes not only from specific managerial, regulatory 
and other actions, but also from the general uncertainty they sow in an endeavor that 
depends upon voluntary private business involvement. 
States are, for now, the crucial institutional constraint on the president’s 
power to undermine the ACA’s marketplace protections. With managerial, litigative, 
legislative, and regulatory actions they have, thus far, protected the individual 
coverage pool, and often in bipartisan ways. The states do so, though, in a piecemeal 
fashion. Similarly, as the state-led lawsuits wend their way through the judicial system, 
the courts might block one regulation or another as a violation of administrative 
procedures or statutory authority. But the courts, given their institutional posture, are 
unlikely to address the generalized threat presented by the executive branch’s myriad 
destabilizing actions.  
Public voices are a growing, non-institutional constraint, albeit an indirect 
one whose impacts are most profound at the ballot box. With this issue the personal 
readily becomes the political. Americans’ stories about health care challenges seem to 
have shifted the political landscape. Although the ACA remains polarizing, there is 
increasing, solidifying support, across party lines, for central features of the law. These 
include pre-existing condition protections and government-grounded coverage options, 
including Medicaid expansion. This support is reflected in the 2018 elections, which 
saw passage of expansion initiatives, and election of state-level and national 
candidates from both parties who campaigned on these issues. 
States, federal courts, and public opinion are important constraints, but robust 
protection against an attempted executive repeal of the ACA requires congressional 
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action. And President Trump might, ironically, have contributed to a leftward shift in 
legislative options going forward. He has repeatedly used the presidential megaphone 
to urge replacement of the ACA with something better that covers everybody, protects 
people with pre-existing conditions, and reduces costs to individuals and families. 
In doing so, President Trump appears to have reinforced a change in the 
public debate from whether the federal government ought to ensure health coverage 
for all Americans to how the federal government ought to do so. Indeed, “refine and 
revise” now seems poised to supplant “repeal and replace” as the conservative 
counterpoint to liberal pressure for a common option grounded in Medicare. Health 
reform’s future will be complicated — but everyone knows that. 
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